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THE SYRIAN WAR:  





Introduction: the Syrian war in the wider context of Arab uprisings 
The popular uprising in Syria, which was mostly ignited in the south 
of the country (Dar‘a), quickly took the form of a violent and exten-
sive conflict, which soon became an open civil war. According to the 
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, some 160,000 deaths have 
occurred since March 2011, but they are probably much more if we 
include the disappeared persons, plus all those who died out of mal-
nutrition and disease because of the appalling sanitary conditions. 
This uprising if, in many instances, began peacefully, also sometimes 
adopted – and this from the very beginning – a verbal (and even 
physical) attitude which was very aggressive against the non Sunni 
religious communities (the Alawites in the first place because of their 
links with the regime, the other Islamic sects, perceived as collusive 
with the political system, and the Christians for similar reasons plus 
their purported hostility to Islam).2 
2    Religious & Political Representation  
 
Another issue has to be considered: the uprising did not exclusively 
take place within the Arab part of the population (thus antagonizing 
Sunnis against Alawites on political as well as on religious lines) but 
also included the Kurds, this Syrian ethnic group (some 10% of the 
population) having promptly jumped onto the train of contestation in 
order to advance specific claims for autonomy (and even pro-
independence demands). Thus, in spite of the – very late – public 
declared intention to naturalize some 300,000 Kurds living in Syria 
(but for the fact that only about 6,000 finally got identity cards by 
decree), in April 2011, the regime proved unable to prevent the 
Kurds from protesting and organizing. In October 2011, the Kurdish 
National Council in Syria was created to support the democratic 
claims put forward in other parts of the country. Yet, the local branch 
of the PKK (the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan), the PYD, did not join 
the demonstrations and even prevented, sometimes very violently, 
fellow Kurds from opposing the regime’s forces, in the hope that 
they could make in the end a good deal for the autonomy of Kurdi-
stan, as in Iraq. Therefore, the different Kurdish factions have trod-
den a delicate path between tactically collaborating with Damascus, 
siding with protesters all over the country, and struggling against Ar-
ab (Islamist and nationalist) armed groups. But this thorny sub-
conflict, which has a dynamic of its own, based on Kurdish aversion 
for the Arab sense of superiority as well as on fierce infighting, will 
not be thoroughly studied here since the problem is mostly ethnic and 
political, with few significant religious characteristics. 
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 If there is no doubt that the regional context of the contesta-
tion (Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya) had a quasi-immediate effect in 
launching the Syrian crisis, one should not forget that the political, 
social, economic, religious, etc., frustrations were not only numerous 
and latent but also ready to flare up, under the pressure of an internal 
dynamic that can be defined as follows: the sharing of power which 
was (viewed as) totally inequitable (and working for the benefit of a 
minority religious community: the Alawites3) and the pressure of 
socioeconomic injustices which were (perceived as) blatant. But 
whereas some solutions, more or less consensual, were found else-
where – in Tunisia and Egypt with free elections, in Yemen with the 
negotiated departure of the president, in Morocco with a constitu-
tional reform controlled by the king, in Algeria with soothing eco-
nomic measures, in Saudi Arabia with the purchase of social peace 
owing to gigantic subventions,4 no institutional process in Syria has 
so far allowed the crisis to calm down, and no political solution is in 
sight (the talks in Geneva have been more about squabbling and pro-
crastinating rather than negotiating).5 
 It is thus interesting to ponder over the contradictions of the 
‘Arab Spring’: through the expression of legitimate requests, the 
peoples have shown that their rights could no longer be denied. But 
the implementation of radical solutions in some instances (like the 
fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes) have pushed some to be-
lieve that such sweeping transitions were possible elsewhere, where-
as a little bit of realism should have indicated that any peaceful 
political evolution in Syria could only have been slow and controlled 
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in order for the country not to sink into chaos, which is the case to-
day. The Arab Spring has thus articulated very legitimate claims ex-
cept that they were unachievable on the short term in Syria, unless 
the regime had been willing to engage into a progressive reform 
guaranteeing the security of the Alawite community and the preemi-
nence of the army on public life, with a certain amount of political 
liberty expected to develop with time (more or less similar to what 
has happened in Turkey for over a decade). One could therefore say 
that the various Arab uprisings have had a negative effect on Syria 
(people killed, hurt, imprisoned, tortured, moved, plus the material 
losses) while trying to profoundly refashion an iniquitous but stable 
balance of coercion, which implied strictly controlled inter-
confessional relationships. 
 
The religious factor as a structuring element of the conflict 
 The importance of the religious factor has been deliberately 
minimized by the Syrian opposition in exile (especially the Syrian 
National Coalition, or SNC)6 since it wanted to give the impression 
that the whole people was united against the regime, and that the cri-
sis was not a religious conflict but, on the contrary, a political fight 
encompassing all the communities (the Alawites amongst them) con-
stituting the nation, whereas the reality on the ground has indicated – 
more and more overtly – the contrary ever since the very beginning. 
When the protests erupted, the demonstrations against the Syrian re-
gime did not focus on religious and community differences but called 
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at first for the reform of the system and then, some time later, for its 
downfall (with the execution of the president), but very often from a 
patriotic stance which endeavored to federate all the people living on 
the national territory, but with the notable exception of some slogans 
and behaviors full of sectarian hatred.7 
The regime, in order not to present itself as a system func-
tioning for the sole benefit of a single community, and more precise-
ly for the unique advantage of a small group belonging to the 
Alawite community (allied to the – Sunni – bourgeoisie for business 
matters), exerted itself to present the crisis as a conflict between a 
nationalist regime fiercely opposed to terrorist groups supported by 
foreign powers (and linked to al-Qa‘ida). All the pro-government 
media adopted the same stance.8 The regime did not put forward the 
hardly contestable (although rather limited at first) religious dimen-
sion of the protest9 in order not to alienate the Sunni part of the popu-
lation which could still have been, if not favorable to it, at least not 
too hostile, and to give the illusion that the whole Syrian people sup-
ported it in its (ferocious) fight against ‘terrorist’ elements. But facts 
betrayed these voluntarily non religious representations: a huge pres-
ence of the Muslim Brotherhood10 within the opposition in exile and 
armed groups on the ground making use of an Islamic-nationalist 
speech (and even advocating jihad), on the one hand, versus almost 
exclusively Alawite armed units faithful to the regime, on the other. 
Rapidly confronted with a real and intensifying jihadist 
threat (bombings, etc.), the regime started to modify its representa-
tion of the crisis through attempts to oppose a moderate and tolerant 
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national form of Islam (in majority Sunni yet including all the other 
tendencies), which it pretended to represent and protect, to a violent 
and exclusive rival brand, imported and financed from abroad.11 In 
March 2013, the Republic’s grand mufti and the regime’s rather dis-
credited creature, Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassun, launched an appeal to 
all loyal Syrians to perform jihad in order to protect the Muslim um-
ma, the Arab nation, and the national territorial integrity from foreign 
expansionist and Zionist plots.12 Yet it clearly seems that the ranks 
were breaking even within the Alawite community, especially for 
young people who did not want to die for the Asad clan, as in 
Qardaha (the family’s birthplace) after the promulgation of the fatwa 
when the military police required youngsters to join the army, which 
some vigorously refused.13 The grand mufti’s fatwa was anyway 
quickly declared totally null and void by the Association of Syrian 
religious scholars which condemned ‘Asad’s forces and the Alawite 
community’ for wreaking irremediable havoc on the Syrian nation.14 
The assassination by mid-March 2013 of a senior cleric, 
sheikh Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti,15 along with some fifty 
people who died in an explosion16 while attending a prayer he was 
performing in a Damascene mosque, hurt the regime in such a way 
that it probably lost its last credible ally among the Sunni religious 
elite. A stalwart traditionalist and quietist devotee, hostile to secular 
Baathist ideology,17 al-Buti, in a weird and old alliance with the Asad 
family, encouraged the regime to ‘cleanse’ the country of Salafi 
zealots. When demonstrations started in March 2011, al-Buti gave 
credence to the regime, which denounced a ‘Zionist conspiracy’. 
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Shortly before his murder, al-Buti was still encouraging the faithful 
to wage jihad in the ranks of the Syrian army (compared once to the 
Companions of the Prophet) in order to defeat the would-be conspir-
acy against Syria. Whoever is responsible, the bombing of a mosque 
could only further radicalize an already sectarian conflict.18 And 
whereas the Syrian president accused the ‘obscurantist and unfaith-
ful’ forces (i.e. the rebels), the then opposition’s leader and cleric 
Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib condemned such an attack against a place of 
worship, and pointed his finger at the regime (which could well have 
planned the killing to prevent Buti’s defection). 
Sometime later (end of May 2013), in an attempt to show 
that the regime could still be viewed as the only legitimate repre-
sentative of moderate and tolerant Islam as well as the sole bulwark 
against jihadism, a secret meeting took place in Barcelona between 
sheikh Hassun and American delegates (some of whom also held an 
Israeli citizenship). The Republic’s mufti seized this occasion to 
stress the willingness of his government to cooperate in order to fight 
and even eradicate what both countries perceive as terrorist groups.19 
The (professional) core of the governmental armed forces is 
essentially Alawite: some 70% of regular soldiers and a huge amount 
of senior officers out of more than a thousand. This body, made of 
around 70,000 men at the beginning of the insurrection (probably 
less than 50,000 now), includes units that staunchly support the re-
gime (like the 3rd and 4th divisions or the Republican Guard). When 
also counting the conscription army (that includes recruits from all 
communities but for the fact that many elements have defected and 
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that Sunni brigades are scarcely engaged for fear of desertion), the 
total would make about 300,000 soldiers, or a little less. The security 
services (almost exclusively made of Alawites, some tens of thou-
sands of people) and the militias (or shabbiha, with many Alawites 
but not only, some 100,000 persons) should finally be added. Rough 
figures indicate that some 135,000 soldiers, intelligence officers, and 
militiamen have been killed since March 2011, about half of them 
being Alawite.20 Plus (mostly) Shiite foreign fighters, some of them 
mercenaries, others volunteers: around 40,000 from Iran, Iraq, Leba-
non, and Afghanistan; and finally, some Russian advisers and sol-
diers. Yet an important amount of absconding has occurred among 
Alawite soldiers and officers, which clearly indicates that the conflict 
between the regime and the non-Islamist rebel groups is sometimes 
more political than religious.21 
On the opposite side, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) used to 
regroup the bulk of the fighters: about 60% (at its highest) out of 
some 150,000 rebels, the majority of them being Sunnis, until the 
attractiveness of other more equipped Islamist groups progressively 
depleted its ranks and the creation of the Islamic Front in late 2013 
stroke a decisive blow to its predominance. If the FSA has adopted a 
more nationalistic stance or less secular one although stamped with 
religious references (in variable proportions according to the places), 
other smaller but well equipped fighting groups that are clearly Is-
lamist22 when not openly jihadist23 would have joined. The com-
bative Islamist posture of some FSA-affiliated brigades, which 
occasionally conveys an aggressive attitude towards Alawites per se, 
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combined with the militant speech and the intimidating behavior of a 
few FSA groups – to the point that one may even speak of ‘Free Syr-
ian secret services’ which behave in some circumstances as arbitrari-
ly as the regime’s intelligence agencies do, though on a larger scale 
for the latter – have helped the ‘official’ authorities to portray their 
adversaries as intolerant and fanatical so-called Muslims who want to 
slay coreligionists, as well as domineering and tyrannical fighters 
who reject law and order.24 Foreign fighters, not numerous (probably 
more than 5% of the rebels?), have seen a regular increase in num-
bers with an over-representation of jihadists. And as far as (Syrian 
and non-native) elements performing jihad are concerned, they cer-
tainly constitute more than 10% of all fighters. 
Albeit statistics are scarcely available, the following religion-
based figures can be advanced: Sunnis (from the Hanafi and Shafi‘i 
schools) form some 70 (and even 75%) of the population, Christians 
are about 10% (some say a bit more, others less: down to 5%, due to 
emigration because of the war), Alawites are between 12 and 20% 
(although the latter figure could be exaggerated), Murshidites (an 
almost centenary scission from Alawites with whom they are often 
erroneously amalgamated) stand for some 1.5%, each of the Druse 
and Ismaili communities represents some 1 to 3%, and there are fi-
nally very few Imami Shiites. According to ethnic criteria, Kurds are 
between 10 and 15%, Armenians some 3% (or less after escaping the 
war-ravaged country), as much as the Turkomans and the Circassians 
united. Lastly, between 60 and 65% are Sunni Arabs. One can easily 
see from the approximate demographic data based on religion and 
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ethnicity as well as from the figures pertaining to the composition of 
the various armed forces that the Syrian crisis holds a clearly pro-
nounced sectarian character: the governmental armed forces are 
mostly run by officers and soldiers from the Alawite minority (aided 
by foreign Shiite coreligionists), whereas the armed opposition 
groups contain very predominantly Sunni elements. 
 
The Alawite ‘religion’ and the traditional hostility of Sunnism 
The Alawite ‘religion’ can be considered as an offshoot from 
Imami Shiism.25 According to biased and unfriendly medieval Sunni 
sources, the Alawite cosmogony would see in Ali (Muhammad’s 
cousin and son-in-law) the embodiment of divinity, and he would 
occupy a preeminent place in the trinity constituted by the essence of 
the ineffable divinity and of its two hypostases: the prophetic voice 
that reveals to human beings the sense of life (Muhammad) and the 
initiator to the religious mysteries (a companion, Salman). This 
forms the thesis which sustains that the body of an imam can be the 
receptacle of divinity (hulul). The Alawite doctrine would believe in 
palingenesis (or regeneration) and metempsycosis (or migration of 
souls, tanasukh), temporary for chosen people but eternal for damned 
ones, the Milky Way being constituted by the souls of believers who 
became stars according to esoteric ideas (derived from Zoroastrian-
ism and Manichaeism) and reminiscences from old pagan (Phenici-
an) cults, the entire creed having been remolded in a syncretic and 
monotheist (partly Christian) perspective. From what is (supposed to 
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be) known, the primacy would be given to allegoric interpretations of 
the sacred Koranic text, which would allow for the non-observation 
of the literal sense of the revealed law (antinomianism or ibaha): 
paucity of mosques, consumption of alcohol, lack of fasting, and un-
veiling of women,26 permissiveness in the regularity of the canonical 
prayers, etc., all of this being viewed as very serious anomalies 
branded by Sunnism as evident proof of irreligiousness, whereas the-
se singularities are mostly related to the centennial influence of a 
poor and marginalized socioeconomic environment. Their so-called 
doctrinal exaggeration thus had (and partly still has) them classified 
within the loathed category of extremist and schismatic Shiites (ghu-
lat). 
Whatever the judgments of the medieval manuscripts on 
them, there is in the first place absolutely no evidence of a general 
continuity from the past to the present concerning their creeds and 
practices – that were and still are disparaged as heretical – all the 
more so since the building process of the modern Syrian state global-
ly transformed the Alawites into a very secular community (through 
the army, the civil service, etc.). This community has thus largely 
been crossed by non-religious ideologies such as Arab nationalism 
(mostly in its Baathist version), communism, etc., which generates 
the following paradox: the accusation of schismatic heresy has been 
directed against the group that is probably the more secular (even if it 
can be assumed that heterodox beliefs still exist, particularly in the 
poorest and less educated segments of the community). 
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In order to condemn what he considered as outrageous doc-
trinal deviancies deserving the capital punishment, the Sunni theolo-
gian of Hanbali rite Ibn Taymiyya (who died in Damascus in 1328) 
promulgated against them a fatwa (a juridical opinion) that anathe-
matized this community and called for its extermination on the 
ground of both conspiracy with the Christians (the Crusaders) and 
apostasy.27 Let us cite some significant passages of this fatwa that 
launched a warlike appeal for collective murder: ‘[…] These people 
called Nusayriyya,28 they and the other kinds of Qarmatians, the Bat-
inis, are more heretical than the Jews and the Christians and even 
more than several heterodox groups […] since they [Nusayris and 
other Batinis] are pretending before the uneducated Muslims that 
they are Shiis and loyal to the People of the House [ahl al-bayt] but 
in reality they do not believe in God, in his messenger, in his holy 
book, in obligation or prohibition, [they do not believe] in reward 
and punishment, in paradise and hell, or in any of the messengers 
prior to Muhammad […] nor in one of the previous religions [prior to 
Islam].29 […] These Durziyya and Nusayriyya are heretics according 
to [the judgment of] all Muslims; their [methods] of slaughter are not 
permitted for eating nor [can a Muslim] marry their women. They 
refuse to pay the jizya [poll tax] and are considered murtaddun [sing. 
murtadd, apostate]. […] They do not accept the obligations of the 
five prayers, the fast of Ramadan or the pilgrimage.30 […] These 
[Nusayris] should be fought as long as they resist, until they accept 
the law of Islam. […] Their fighters should be killed and their prop-
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erty should be confiscated. […] They should be compelled to obey 
Islamic law; if they refuse they must be killed.31 […]’ 
Another scaring fatwa has to be recalled: that of Nuh Afandi 
al-Hanafi al-Hamidi, the Ottoman state’s sheikh al-islam, which was 
promulgated in 1638. Here are some excerpts: ‘Keep in mind that 
these renegades (kafara), oppressors (bughat), and debauched people 
(fajara) combine all the forms of impiety (kufr), infringement 
(baghy), and obduracy (inad) as well as the manifestations of deprav-
ity (fisq), Manichaeism (zandaqa), and heresy (ilhad). Those who 
tolerate their godlessness (kufr) and their heterodoxy (ilhad), whereas 
it is incumbent [upon the believers] to fight them and permissible to 
kill them, are infidels (kafir) like them. […] Concerning the iniquity, 
they rose against the obedience due to the imam […] for God said: 
{[…] Fight ye (all) against the one that transgresses until it complies 
with the command of God. […]}32 This order is imperious. […] They 
mock at religion and scoff at the clear divine law. […] They deem 
licit what is forbidden and soil what is sacred. […] They are infidels 
(kafirun) who estimate that the great Koran is false and who publicly 
insult the Prophet […] through attributing this monumental event to 
his kin. […] It thus falls [to the believers] to eliminate these execra-
ble (ashrar), irreligious (kuffar), and profligate (fujjar) people, may 
they repent or not, since it is not licit to let them as they are, [even] 
against the payment of the tribute (jizya), nor to grant them a safe-
guarding (aman), be it temporary or permanent. It is allowed to re-
duce their women to bondage since the servitude of the apostate 
(murtadda) […] is licit. […]’33 
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Useless to say, these fatwas and likewise anathematizing 
opinions were forbidden in Syria (at least before the chaos which 
started in March 2011) and could therefore only be found in private 
or very specific libraries. Just one example to show that present per-
ceptions are highly inspired by medieval representations: Islamist 
and jihadist propaganda speaks more of the ‘Nusayri army’ than of 
the ‘regime army’, which would be more neutral. 
 
A history loaded with sectarian blood spilling 
 In order to better understand the religion-related stakes on 
which the different media have built their views, we need to evoke a 
history that shows all too well the acuteness of a secular antagonism 
between Alawites and Sunnis, indeed even between Alawites and 
other minorities (especially the Ismailis with whom they share histor-
ical, theological, and geographical common points). After the 1305 
fatwa started a series of aggressions, the bloodiest of which will be 
mentioned: the 1317 Alawite revolt lead to a repression commanded 
by the Mamluk sultan (some 20,000 dead plus the obligation to build 
a mosque in each village); the 1344 military expedition in the Ala-
wite region; the 1516 repression by the Ottoman sultan Selim (some 
10,000 dead); the 1805 bloody confrontation between Alawite and 
Ismaili peasants (plus 1806, 1808, 1809, 1811, 1816, 1900); the 1811 
four-month- long siege of the Alawite mountain by the Ottoman ar-
my; the 1832-1841 crushing of the Alawite resistance by Muhammad 
Ali’s Egyptian army; the many attacks of the Alawite country by Ot-
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toman forces (1834, 1847, 1858, 1870, and 1877). 
 The theoretical end of internecine massacres after the prom-
ulgation of the 1909 Ottoman law on religious freedom calmed the 
old climate of mutual aggressions. The French mandate (1920-1946) 
also contributed to ease the community tensions, which nonetheless 
continued to exist, and encouraged the military promotion of Ala-
wite, Druse, and Ismaili officers within what was to become the new 
national armed forces. After independence, the conservative political 
forces (which were aided by military rulers) did not create a situation 
where the Sunni animosities against the minorities could be exacer-
bated, in the sense that the traditional order was maintained (domi-
nance of the Sunni landowners and bourgeoisie). But after the 
Baathist takeover in February 1963, the minorities (among them the 
Alawites) started to break away from their ancestral marginalization 
since the new regime included many officers from the edged out 
communities, and these are the ones that began their ascension in the 
state’s apparatus. 
 In the spring of 1964, a wave of nationalizations initiated by 
the secular, socialist, and Arabist Baath ended in fierce urban demon-
strations that started in Hama (where a call to jihad was launched, 
which caused the shelling of the great mosque by governmental forc-
es). The same troubles happened a year later. In February 1966, a 
Baathist internal coup modified the composition of the regime,  that 
became increasingly and virulently pan-Arabist and vehemently 
Marxist. But the excesses of this adventurism led to another internal 
coup (November 1970) conducted by Hafiz al-Asad, the minister of 
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defense, who became president of the Republic. When a rather secu-
lar project of constitution was proposed in 1972-1973 (Islam did not 
have to be the state’s religion), troubles erupted in the conservative 
Muslim part of the population, which compelled the regime to step 
back (Islam only needed to be the president’s religion). From 1976 
onwards, a strong political and religious Sunni opposition set the 
country ablaze with bomb attacks and assassinations. In June 1979, 
an attack against the Aleppo military academy resulted in the death 
of some 80 Alawite officer cadets. Riots in Aleppo and Hama en-
sued, and the repression left some 2,000 dead in Aleppo. The trou-
bles extended to the south of Aleppo, in Jisr al-Shughur where some 
150 civilians were killed (March 1980) after a violent Sunni opposi-
tion denouncing the regime as secularizing and thus irreligious. Ar-
rests, tortures, and executions became common in this context of 
fierce community feuds and expeditious emergency justice. In June 
1980, around 500 political Islamist prisoners were massacred in Pal-
myra prison after a failed assault on president Asad. Then, in April 
1981, a collective slaughter (some 400 people dead) was carried out 
in Hama in retaliation for a bloody attack against a neighboring Ala-
wite village. 
 The crisis culminated in February 1982 when an Islamist 
insurrection flared in Hama (with the killing of Alawites, Baathist 
members, and Christians) before being crushed by the regime’s forc-
es: a part of the city was totally destroyed and an unknown number 
of people were decimated (maybe up to 20,000 in about two weeks). 
This marked the end of the Muslim Brotherhood’s opposition and 
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even existence in Syria for years to come. It is obvious that the 
memory of these sad events is very present in the minds of the antag-
onist sides today since the religious and political aspects of the con-
flict have rapidly become intertwined, with a mutual fear of 
collective vengeance, which events can barely refute. On a purely 
theological, doctrinal, and jurisprudential ground, and confronted by 
such religious attacks, a justification was carried out by many Ala-
wite sheikhs as well as secular personalities (mainly) from the same 
community, with the regime’s acquiescence. The purpose was to 
neutralize conservative Sunnism arguments, which considered Ala-
wites as heretics, in order to protect the whole community in general 
and to ensure the durability of the system in particular. Many of these 
works were published in Syria during the 1990s, with relatively im-
portant publicity but without any visible influence on the Syrian 
Sunni part of the population, not to mention foreign Sunnism. Even 
the Lebanese Shiite clerical authorities do not seem to have given a 
lot of credit to these publications, which strove to justify the Islamic 
orthodox character of the Alawites. 
 
The revivification of Sunni animosity vis-à-vis Shiism 
 The political tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran during 
the past decades have turned into a regional conflict between 
Sunnism and Shiism (which includes Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Leba-
non). With the exception of particular political stakes, this belliger-
ence between Islam’s two main trends is reminiscent of the ancient 
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wars between Catholics and Protestants that continued until a not too 
remote period of Europe’s history, with all of the preposterous creeds 
and irrational behaviors that these tensions brought with them (that 
is, the raucous and degrading execration of a part of humankind for 
abstruse Byzantine reasons). 
 It may thus seem that many Sunni preachers (among whom, 
Syrians34) have tried to revive the religious animosity of yore, one of 
them being the sheikh of Egyptian origin Yusuf Qaradawi who more 
than once branded the Syrian regime as criminal on the grounds of 
political disagreements as well as of doctrinal divergences, but with-
out mentioning the atrocities committed by some Sunni rebels.35 The 
initial silence of the Qatari channel al-Jazeera – Qaradawi’s favorite 
rostrum – on Syrian events (so as not to hurt Damascus for political 
as well as financial interests) was broken after a few weeks by this 
preacher on this television channel, which carried subsequently a 
fatal blow to the relations between Syria and Qatar. Since then, it 
clearly seems that the coverage of events by al-Jazeera has been radi-
cally modified to vilify the Syrian regime, depicted as criminal. One 
should moreover note that Qaradawi has apparently not taken a pub-
lic stance against the fierce repression implemented by Bahrain (ow-
ing to Saudi foreign troops and Pakistani mercenaries) to silence the 
national unrest, but he has on the contrary qualified the Shiite oppo-
nents of people spreading ill-feeling and discord despite the fact that 
the discriminations towards them clearly appear to be numerous.36 
 Another influential Sunni preacher, the Egyptian Safwat Hi-
gazi, close to the Muslim Brotherhood and furthermore president of 
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the Association of Sunni clerics, promulgated (March 2012) a fatwa 
calling for the murder of president Asad, while even making it clear 
that whoever had access to him without attempting to assassinate him 
committed a deadly sin. Slaughtering Bashar al-Asad, according to 
him, was thus the concern of the entire Muslim nation. Other similar 
fatwas have been issued like the one put forward by the Islamic Le-
gitimate Body of Rights and Reformation (an independent body of 
Muslim scholars) under the pretext that the Syrian government armed 
forces do not respect the sacredness of the mosques, kill innocent 
civilian lives, and rampage about the country, yet with a noticeable 
underestimation of the virulence of some armed groups fighting the 
regime and occasionally (purposely or not) killing innocent people as 
well.37 Safwat Higazi has moreover made some inflammatory re-
marks against Egypt’s Copts as well as against Shiite religious fig-
ures, going so far as to threaten a Shiite Kuwaiti religious leader with 
death.38 
 Another preacher to mention is Adnan al-Aroor, native of 
Hama and a former soldier from the Syrian army39 who fled the 
country during the ferocious repression against the Muslim Brother-
hood in the 1980s. Living in exile in Saudi Arabia, he has become a 
Wahhabi cleric quite easily advocating the excommunication (takfir) 
of his adversaries. Pointing to the non-Sunni schools and tendencies 
of Islam, he has subjected the Alawite community to public obloquy, 
taking up again Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa. By the middle of the 2000s, 
he started running a program on TV Wisal, a Kuwaiti channel, and 
has said in a recent broadcast that he divides the Alawites into three 
20    Religious & Political Representation  
categories: those who have supported the opposition, those who have 
remained neutral (and to whom no wrong will be done), and those 
who have collaborated with the regime, the fate of the last being the 
following: ‘Those who sully sacred things will go through the chop-
per and their flesh will be fed to dogs.’40 If the leadership of the FSA 
was rather hostile to him at the beginning, it finally got close to him 
(end of 2012) because of his rising ideological influence within rebel 
ranks as well as due to much needed military Saudi backing. Saudi 
media, for their part, describe him as a rather moderate personality 
who is simply calling for peaceful protest.41 Aroor also appears regu-
larly on the widely watched satellite channel al-Safa (broadcast from 
Saudi Arabia) where he is known for his programs criticizing non-
Sunni Islamic minorities fighting with the Syrian government. Out of 
a surge of Arab chauvinism, the sheikh has also warned Syrian Kurds 
against any wishful impulse for autonomy.42 Some moderate Syrian 
clerics criticize his radicalism while other Sunni scholars (like the 
Saudi sheikh Salih al-Fawzan) view him as an impostor. Regardless 
of his theological standing and media artfulness, he has recently 
launched virulent attacks against the al-Qa‘ida-loosely linked Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) whose unbending interpretation of 
Islam and transnational military strategy oppose both national reli-
gious traditions and Saudi interests.43 
 Besides, ISIL, created in Iraq in 2006 and active in Syria 
since 2013, a fanatical jihadist movement more involved in interne-
cine strife against challenging (Arab and Kurdish) armed groups, and 
also implicated in numerous acts of violence against civilians (‘revo-
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lutionary’ looting, repression, torture, and murder), whereas its mili-
tary record against governmental troops is poor (for it aims in the 
first place at controlling a vast expanse of (oil-rich) land in the north 
and north-east, not at fighting around Damascus or in other contested 
zones), has nevertheless been used by the Syrian regime as a scape-
goat to justify the repression against the opposition (armed or not), 
globally depicted as the embodiment of Islamist terrorism. The as-
sumption that ISIL is empowering the sectarian divisions in Syria is 
questionable for two reasons: firstly, ISIL is for a large part a foreign 
group, operating in a region with no huge concentration of govern-
ment forces, and because the sectarian splits are anterior to its activi-
ty in Syria. 
 Without attempting to reach exhaustiveness, let us cite an-
other preacher, the Saudi cleric Salih al-Luhaydan who has recently 
declared that a third of the Syrian people (probably, according to 
him, the Alawites in addition to the Christians, the Ismailis, and the 
Druze) could be killed if this ensured the security of the two remain-
ing thirds (certainly the Sunnis).44 Last but not least, the Lebanese 
preacher from Saida, Ahmad al-Asir, who was first affiliated to the 
local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, then to the Pakistani 
Tabligh movement, and then to salafism, has publicly said that the 
Alawites were slaughtering Sunnis, a stern and poorly balanced 
statement on the Syrian civil war that the local media passed on for 
different reasons. More generally, it is clear that all the Sunni reac-
tionary media (those of the salafi brand like al-Hikma TV, al-Nas 
TV, etc., plus similar sites on the web) actively diffuse this kind of 
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hostile messages against the Syrian regime, perceived (not without 
any evidence) as related to one single community, itself stigmatized 
as heretical and despicable. 
 
The media’s political role 
As religion is often exploited for political aims, overtly or in-
sidiously, by the Arab regimes that get a part of their legitimacy from 
Islam, it seems important to analyze the political role devoted to the 
media as well as to ponder over their religious impact since, in most 
cases, religion only aims at consolidating stances related to political 
and economic matters (with concrete material interests, not connect-
ed to spirituality). Many media that could be described as ‘Arab and 
Sunni’ have extensively covered since the spring of 2011 the mis-
deeds and crimes of the Syrian government armed forces.45 And the 
more these media are sensitive to conservative or even reactionary 
Sunnism, the more virulent their critics are against president Asad’s 
regime, sometimes with a direct religious condemnation. On the con-
trary, the same media are more reticent to show the abuses commit-
ted by the rebel factions against the government military (like the 
torture of war prisoners and their execution in dubious conditions), 
the militiamen (only viewed as thieves and murderers, which they 
truly often are), and even civilians from the minorities (whenever 
they are considered as informers). The many media hostile to Da-
mascus thus contribute to the creation of a consensus, within the (Ar-
ab and Muslim) public opinion, which suggests that no controversy 
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should reasonably be raised about the criminal nature of the Syrian 
regime. 
Al-Jazeera, the Qatari channel created in 1996, derives its in-
formative value from the presence of various correspondents in nu-
merous dangerous places, as well as from resorting to local informers 
hidden in war zones who communicate via the internet. These net-
works of professional and amateur journalists offer an incommen-
surable window into understanding what is going on. Yet the regions 
still loyal to the Syrian regime are not covered,46 which renders the 
presentation of facts unbalanced. The good relations between Qatar 
and Syria deteriorated after March 2011, which was reflected in al-
Jazeera’s programs, because of a very clumsy management of the 
crisis by the Syrian authorities (declarations of appeasement which 
did not match the ferocity of the repression) and humanitarian mo-
tives (the impossibility of remaining insensible in front of such a 
blind and collective quelling). Whereas Qatar got close to Iran in the 
1990s to escape from the pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia, and sub-
sequently stroke up relations with Syria at the beginning of the 2000s 
(which allowed this country to break out of its isolation after the 
murder of ex-premier Hariri in 2005), the Syrian crisis has been the 
occasion to redirect the Emirate’s diplomacy towards Saudi Arabia,47 
with the relinquishing of the privileged ties formed with president 
Asad’s regime (and incidentally with Iran). Although religious affini-
ties do not appear to be predominant in this new partnership, one 
should nevertheless admit that a Sunni axis has been built between 
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Doha and Riad (with the addition of Ankara) to bolster the (predomi-
nantly Sunni) Syrian opposition and counter Teheran’s ambitions.48 
France 24 TV channel offers a coverage that is rather unfa-
vorable to Damascus, thus reflecting the official position of the 
French government that is torn between conflicting considerations: a 
decade-old relationship with Bashar which has turned into an irre-
versible disgust for the atrocities he can be held responsible for on 
one side, and a fear that the regime’s (chemical) arsenal may fall into 
the hands of jihadists (as in Libya) on the other. The French broad-
casting radio station RFI (Radio France International) has adopted 
the same stance. It seems that neither France 24 nor RFI have fo-
cused on the religious element in order not to inflame an already 
complex conflict by considerations other than political, in the sense 
that religious beliefs and community allegiances are difficult to over-
look since they are organically related to primordial identities, 
whereas political disputes may (at least theoretically) always find 
some sort of solutions.49 The religious paradigm is thus viewed as an 
useless focus on insuperable and fierce antagonisms. The non-
religious treatment of the war has also been motivated by the fact that 
the French authorities can hardly contemplate to see the entire Ala-
wite community (which cannot reasonably be collectively accused of 
active complicity with the regime’s savagery) defamed, marginal-
ized, and brutalized, and refuse to see the Christians presented as 
(even passive) collaborators and consequently chastised. 
It has to be highlighted that the French mandate in the Levant 
(1920-1946) outrageously favored the minorities to better dominate 
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the country: a separate Alawite statelet was created (1922-1936) to 
weaken the Syrian nationalist forces, and Alawites were moreover 
recruited into the mandatory security apparatus (before it became the 
national army after independence). Quite similarly, France never 
loosened its efforts to protect the Christians living in Syria, Lebanon, 
and Palestine because it is morally and legally responsible for the 
Levant’s Catholics ever since the treaty between king François Ist and 
the Ottoman sultan Soliman (1536). One of the fears that prevent the 
French government (and the state media) from branding the confes-
sional argument in order to explain the random violence lies maybe 
less in compassion for the Syrian Christians’ fate than in the brewing 
dangers which threaten the Lebanese Maronites if war were to set 
aglow in Lebanon. 
More generally, it seems that the majority of the foreign 
(Western) media have adopted a rather cautious stance towards the 
Syrian Christians as well as vis-à-vis the other religious minorities 
(Druze and Ismailis essentially), given the fact that the conflict looks 
inextricable, that these minorities are not collectively responsible for 
the regime’s roughness and lawlessness, and that they will necessari-
ly be part of the hoped for political solution (which means that their 
sensibilities and anxieties must be respected). On the other hand, the 
salafi and jihadi media forcibly utter obstreperous critics and threat-
ening admonishments in the hope that these minorities will rapidly 
distance themselves more sharply from the regime, which would 
therefore be doomed to fall shortly. The visit of the Lebanese Maro-
nite patriarch to Damascus (February 2013) was thus covered in an 
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ambivalent way: was he attempting to morally legitimize the regime 
(as a so-called traditional protector of non-Sunnis) or merely trans-
mitting an apostolic message of faith to all Christians in such hard 
times? Finally, the presence in France of many Syrian opponents, 
regularly invited by the media to comment on the Syrian conflict, 
offers a political (rather than religious) analysis of the crisis since 
they are on the whole secular-minded. For different reasons, the far 
right political party, the National Front, which struggles against the 
rising influence of Islam in France, stands almost alone since it op-
poses any foreign intervention in Syria, firstly on the ground of the 
‘intangible principle of national sovereignty’ which its ideology pro-
fesses, and secondly because any eventual interference to help topple 
the regime would probably benefit the more radical Islamist fight-
ers.50 
 
Religious representations: towards consensus or controversy? 
Media like al-Jazeera that have endeavored from the very 
beginning to tarnish the Syrian regime and counter its propaganda 
have undoubtedly adopted positions sympathetic to the Islamist main 
trend represented by the Muslim brotherhood, which has tried to 
dominate the opposition in exile.51 If it has met a large echo among 
anti-government Syrians, this channel has been perceived by the oth-
er Syrians as a very biased media striving to create chaos in order to 
promote obscure and doubtful interests. The religious character of the 
conflict has also been strengthened in June 2013 when the Saudi Su-
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preme Committee for the Pilgrimage decided to bestow exclusively 
on the SNC, the political body in exile, the prestigious responsibility 
of organizing the hajj to Mecca, which concerns some 20,000 Syri-
ans each year. Five offices outside Syria and three within the ‘liber-
ated’ territories have been open, and they are the only agencies 
accredited by the Saudis to promulgate the necessary permits, in 
what stands for a fierce political rivalry about the monopoly of this 
paramount canonical Islamic duty.52 
The creation in November 2013 of the Islamic Front, fi-
nanced by Turkey and Qatar with the patronage of Saudi Arabia, has 
changed the military situation since the seven armed groups which 
compose it comprise altogether between 50 and 80,000 fighters, 
more than the mildly Islamist and nationalist-inclined FSA, and may 
offer a credible Islamist alternative (oscillating between the Brother-
hood and salafism) to the dreadful global jihadists (like Jabhat al-
Nusra or JN, and even more ISIL). On the battlefield, since the 
Brotherhood has only recently been able to organize itself into a sin-
gle powerful military protagonist,53 much of the weaponry has gone 
to visible and radical (jihadi) groups (like Liwa al-tawhid and Ahrar 
al-Sham) which have been legitimized through their militant prowess 
and (not always neutral) foreign press reporting. The Islamic Front’s 
ferocious battle against ISIL has been hailed by the Aleppo clerics as 
a victory on ‘whom has never submitted to God’s law […] nor hand-
ed over the criminals to sharia courts.’54 The Mujahidin Army, re-
cently (end of 2013) organized in the north-west and which 
comprises eight fighting groups, has also engaged in fierce warfare 
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against ISIL to drive it out of Syria on the grounds that it has ‘out-
raged God’s power’ and has spread ‘corruption and civil strife’ 
among Syrians and Muslims.55 These two military initiatives, apart 
from the tactical changes they may create on the battlefield, will cer-
tainly alter the internal and foreign perceptions about the actors’ na-
tionalist and religious credentials. 
The president of the Damascus-based Muslim Clerics’ Asso-
ciation, Usama Rifa‘i, a pious and revered preacher from the capital’s 
suburbs, has gone through (sometimes violent) tribulations which 
may reflect both the complexity and the worsening of the situation. 
Having at first urged his followers not to protest violently – or even 
not at all – and remain meek, while softly criticizing the regime with 
purely moral exhorting,56 he was shortly afterward assaulted by some 
Alawite militia in his mosque and badly wounded whereas the wor-
shippers were severely beaten and viciously abused,57 in spite of his 
unheeded calls for help to some ‘friendly’ intelligence service.58 
More recently, conscious of the fact that the situation has dangerous-
ly deteriorated and that (indirectly) supporting the regime (or in reali-
ty just tolerating it) may be the least bad option to ensure a minimum 
level of stability (for Damascene Sunni Muslims first and then for the 
country) in front of rising global jihadist threats, he has sternly ma-
ligned ISIL for ‘deeming permissible the spilling of Muslims’ 
blood’.59 In so doing, he is one of the prominent and consensual per-
sonalities to have taken part in the reshuffling of the political and 
religious cards in the least possible controversial way. This may in a 
way have heartened the regime, although the latter has up to now 
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seemed to prefer a disastrous modus vivendi with ISIL, a scarecrow 
and one of the internal attrition tools directed against the whole 
armed rebellion, whose basis have been spared by the government air 
force’s attacks.60 
If the Geneva talks (which ended in February 2014) have not 
scored any decisive goal for neither the regime nor the political op-
position, since the former has used this forum for procrastinating 
while the other has endeavored to buttress its legitimacy, it neverthe-
less emerges from the diplomatic wrangling that the regime has suc-
ceeded in regaining a bit of much needed recognition, for it is – yet 
very cautiously and reluctantly – considered by Western chanceller-
ies as an acceptable option so far as uncontrollable jihadists dominate 
the battleground. The Ma‘an massacre (mid-February 2014), when 
some 50 Alawite civilians were slaughtered by jihadists who cut 
women’s and children’s throats in a retaliatory raid, sounded like a 
godsend for a regime at bay and in desperate need of sectarian bar-
barians to demonize.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Senior lecturer (authorized to supervise researches) at the University of Le 
Havre (France) in Arabic language and civilization, Ph.D. in political science ob-
tained from the Institut d’études politiques (IEP) de Paris. 
2 Very virulent threats were voiced during some demonstrations, like in 
Qatana (some 15 kilometres north-west of the capital), in the spring of 2011, against 
Alawites whose ‘throats had to be slit’ and Christians who had to be ‘expelled from 
the country’. Similarly, some cases of sectarian murders (against Alawites and Isma-
ilis) were reported (for instance near Masyaf, west of Hama), according to some 
field research we conducted in October 2011. Yet, these expressions of hatred were 
not as widespread as the regime pretended. 
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3 Whereas a huge amount of political prisoners used to be from the Alawite 
community, from 1970 onwards, which invalidates the thesis according to which this 
group has collectively benefited from the accession to power of Hafez al-Asad. 
4 Around $40 billion, according to different estimates. 
5 During the beginning of 2011, some important measures of appeasement 
were taken by president Asad to calm down the crisis: cancellation of the state of 
emergency and authorization of peaceful demonstrations in April, general amnesty 
in May, multi-party system in August, etc. But the concomitant brutality of the 
crackdown has impeded any negotiated solution. A new general amnesty in October 
2013, similarly, had almost no effect on the intensity of the protests, not to mention 
the June 2014 presidential elections (with three candidates) disparaged by the oppo-
sition. Will the general amnesty, which has been announced a few days after this 
election, and which may concern tens of thousands of jailed persons, be enough to 
create a climate propitious to genuine negotiations? 
6 The opposition in exile had obviously much more leeway to organize and 
present a ‘coherent’ analysis of the conflict than the people struggling inside Syria, 
who were submitted to a brutal repression, which did not allow them to hold political 
gatherings. 
7 See note 2. It is impossible to have a precise idea of this sectarian hatred, 
which remains in any case a peripheral element among a population who is rather 
tolerant, even though some trends of Syrian Sunnism are very conservative, and 
even reactionary. The author of these lines remembers, for instance, having listened 
a few years ago (before March 2011) to some sermons given in mosques situated in 
Qabun, a popular and traditional suburb of Damascus. As it was not conceivable to 
publicly excommunicate the Alawites, the preachers had only the (controlled) possi-
bility to describe Christians as ‘infidels and heretics’. Similarly, Alawite peasants in 
the Hama countryside admitted (during field research and interviews) their support 
for the regime, although they were poor and neglected by the central authorities, by 
fear of being ‘slaughtered by Sunni extremists’. If the regime has, in a Machiavellian 
way, used this fear for political purpose, this feeling of alarm was nonetheless very 
real. 
8 Like some private TV channels: Sama, al-Dunya, al-Ikhbariyya (Syria 
News), and the public ones. The private Syrian channel based in Dubai, Orient 
News, has covered the events quite differently since it appears to be a little more 
balanced and critical: it thus admits that atrocities have been committed but tries to 
distance the president from the carnage carried out by the official armed forces. For 
Arab News Network, the channel owned by Rif‘at al-Asad (an uncle of the president 
with connections to Algeria and Saudi Arabia) and that broadcasts from London, the 
coverage is more critical, probably for internal family feuds about power. This chan-
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nel may thus try to offer a credible alternative to the Alawite community (which 
pays a high tribute to the fighting), to the Syrian opposition (yet with dubious results 
because of Rif‘at’s previous involvement in the repression against the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1980s), and to the foreign countries which favor a political 
change, but without insisting too much on the rebellion’s religious commitment. The 
ANNA news agency, based in the separatist part of Abkhazia (the irredentist claims 
of which are supported by Russia), is for its part rather famous for its footage of the 
Syrian conflict. Its diffusion of war images via the internet clearly indicates a bias in 
favor of the regime. 
9 The majority of the Alawite community continues to support the regime 
whereas Christians are hesitant and divided (yet mildly supportive), like the Druses 
and Ismailis. On the contrary, Sunnis are on the whole (but with many exceptions) 
opposed to president Asad, for different reasons, in part religious. For the divisions 
within the body of the Sunni preachers, see 
http://www.academia.edu/1493604/The_Role_of_the_Mosque_in_the_Syrian_Revol
ution. 
10 Raphaël LEFÈVRE, ‘Révolution et violence en Syrie: l’héritage des Frères 
musulmans’, in Maghreb Machrek, n° 213, Autumn 2012, p. 65-81. 
11 Like Jabhat al-Nusra, the jihadist organization formed between the end of 
2011 and the beginning of 2012, the official al-Qa‘ida’s franchise in Syria, which is 
fiercely hostile to the Alawites, condescending towards the Christians, and responsi-









15 Thomas PIERRET, Baas et islam en Syrie. La dynastie Assad face aux 
oulémas, Paris, PUF, 2011, 329 pages. 
16 According to a video, the explosion may be fake since the people seem to 
have been killed by gunshots. 
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17 See Dr. Mohamed Saïd Ramadan AL-BOUTI, Le jihad en islam. Comment 
le comprendre et comment le pratiquer?, (translation by Mohamed Nabil Al-
Khayat), Damascus, Dar al-Fikr, 1996, 328 pages. 
18 http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=18242. 
19 http://all4syria.info/Archive/85590. 
20 The following figures are just approximations, inferred from field re-
search, interviews, and internet sites (through the matching up of available data with 
other informations). Fahd al-Masri, the speaker for the General Command of the 
Free Syrian Armed Forces, based in Paris, is one valuable source of information: 
http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/Arabic/Security/?id=3.2.1098461728. Another one 
is the blog run by a former French diplomat, Ignace Leverrier: 
http://syrie.blog.lemonde.fr/author/syrie. See also Tam Hussein’s investigations. 
And Stéphane VALTER, ‘Rivalités et complémentarités au sein des forces armées: le 
facteur confessionnel en Syrie’, in Les Champs de Mars, n° 23 (Winter 2011), dossi-
er: La place et le rôle des armées dans le monde arabe contemporain, review of the 
Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire, Paris, La Documentation Fran-
çaise, April 2012, 171 pages, p. 79-96. And ‘La structuration des forces armées en 
Syrie par le facteur religieux’, in Moyen-Orient, n° 17, January-March 2013, p. 34-
39. 
21 http://all4syria.info/Archive/73461, http://all4syria.info/Archive/72951. 
22 Nur in Idlib, Dhu al-Nurayn and Malik in Homs, Tawhid in Aleppo, Suqur 
al-Sham in the west of Jabal Zawiya, Ansar al-Islam and Islam around Damascus, 
etc. (data from the beginning of 2013). See also the Ansar al-Sham battalions (near 
Latakia and Idlib): http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55066 (March 
2014). 
23 Jabhat al-Nusra, Faruq in Homs, the Front of Syrian Revolutionaries (with 
Ahrar al-Sham), Umma in the north-east and centre, al-Muslimun yusharikun, Fajr 
al-Islam in Aleppo, Firqat Sulayman al-Muqatila in Hama and in Jabal Zawiya, 
Shuhada al-Sham, Qisas, Ghuraba al-Sham, etc. Aron LUND, Syrian Jihadism, 
UIbrief, n° 13, sept. 2012. 
24 See for instance the creation of an extended security branch within the 
resistance around the capital, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dbkvB_8OylY. 
25 Stéphane VALTER, ‘La réplique à Ibn Baz (1912-1999) de Abd al-Rahman 
al-Khayyir (1904-1986)…’, in Bulletin d’études orientales (Institut Français 
d’Études Arabes de Damas), n° LV, 2003, p. 299-383. 
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26 The very conservative tendencies of Sunnism, followed by the Orientalist 
tradition, have incorrectly imagined that the Alawite women could be given as an 
offertory to initiated people, by immorality and because the women are supposed to 
be deprived of (celestial) souls. 
27 This fatwa was partially translated by Edward SALISBURY, Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, tome II, 1851. Then a more complete translation was 
written in French by Stanislas GUYARD, ‘Le fetwa d’Ibn Taimiyyah sur les Nosairis’, 
in Journal asiatique, sixth series, tome XVIII, August-September 1871, p. 158-198. 
The present quote comes from Yaron FRIEDMAN, The Nusayri-Alawis: An Introduc-
tion to the Religion, History, and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria, Leiden, 
Brill, 2010, 325 pages, p. 188-197. 
28 The depreciatory term for Alawites (that indicates a kinship with Ali) since 
‘Nusayri’ refers to a medieval (9th century) eponymous Iraqi propagandist. 
29 Ibid., p. 189. 
30 Ibid., p. 192. 
31 Ibid., p. 194. 
32 Sura XLIX, The Inner Apartments, (al-Hujurat), verse 9. 
33 For a French translation and the Arabic reference, VALTER, ‘La réplique à 
Ibn Baz…’, op. cit., p. 380-381. 
34 The conservative thinker Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib (1886-1969), the Mus-
lim Brother Said Hawa (1935-1989), the theologian Abu Basir al-Tartusi (born in 
1959) who nonetheless remains sometimes critical of those who want to practice 
jihad. See Thomas PIERRET’s works, http://edinburgh.academia.edu/ThomasPierret. 
35 Qaradawi has spoken of the Syrian army which is still loyal to the regime 
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42 http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/8/syriakurd595.htm. The 
Islamic Front, recently created under the aegis of Saudi Arabia, also categorically 
rejects any wishful irredentist Kurdish claim. 
43 http://www.altawhid.org/2013/10/28/. Romain CAILLET argues that ISIL 






46 Mostly because the accreditations of the channel’s journalists were reject-
ed by the Syrian authorities. 
47 By mid-2007, the Qatari authorities seem to have acquiesced in controlling 
al-Jazeera’s programs dealing with the coverage of internal Saudi affairs. 
http://www.gremmo.mom.fr/sites/gremmo.mom.fr/files/docs/Activites/Zoom_sur/sy
rieetqatarnov2011.pdf. Qatar had invested some $6 billion in Syria before the up-
heaval. 
48 The arms shipped at the behest of Saudi Arabia and Qatar to supply Syrian 
rebel groups are usually going to hardline Islamists rather than to more secular-
minded opposition groups (like the FSA that the West wants to bolster), while at the 
same time these two states fear arming global jihadists (like JN and ISIL) for securi-
ty reasons, since such fighting organizations may later revert their arms against Sau-
di and Qatari interests. Two prominent Saudi sheikhs, Ali b. Abbas al-Hakami and 
Abd Allah al-Mutlaq, issued in June 2012 a fatwa forbidding nationals to go to Syria 
in order to perform jihad on the pretext that such an initiative was an act of insubor-
dination against the Saudi sovereign and could disrupt order 
(http://www.muslm.org/vb/showthread.php?482539). On the contrary, private salafi 
donors from (or via) Koweit do not hesitate to finance generously the more radical 
Islamists. 
 The Iranian regional policy aims at securing the axis between Teheran, 
Baghdad, Damascus, and the Bekaa valley in Lebanon, in order to alleviate the bur-
Syria Studies   35 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
den of the sanctions imposed by America and its allies, and to promote national in-
terests. This axis is thus not as much based on religious affinities (which do exist) as 
on common perceptions about which kind of political order is more beneficial. See 
Nikolay A. Khozanov’s analysis in http://www.fairobserver.com. Concerning the 
assumption that Iran has put oil on the Syrian fire, it would rather seem that Teheran 
has at first pushed for some kind of national dialogue, for fear of seeing chaos in an 
allied country. In the summer of 2011 (with already some 2,000 people dead), the 
Iranian president declared – with some degree of dishonesty – that ‘governments 
must respect and recognize their nations’ rights to freedom and justice’ and that 
‘military repression is never a good solution’. But when disorder and violence ex-
panded, it finally decided nolens volens to help president Asad’s regime, which it 
still supports as long as it is useful to Iranian goals. 
49 As what happened in the Ivory Coast in April 2011, owing to the pressure 
exerted by French forces (under UN mandate). Although the case of Kosovo is polit-
ical (power struggle around land and material advantages), the ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious factors (mostly between Serbs and Albanians) are so acute that the situation 
is far from being stabilized. 
50 According to an interview given to the pro-regime Syrian channel Sama. 
51 The Muslim Brotherhood has been whole-heartedly supported by Qatar, a 
generous funder of the opposition to president Asad, and also by Turkey, which have 
both tried to impose their agenda on the battleground like on the Syrian National 
Council, and then (after November 2012) on the Syrian National Coalition, two po-
litical structures within which the Brotherhood has not hesitated to back secular and 
liberal personalities (like the Christian leftist Georges Sabra) to better promote its 
own goals through friendly coalitions. After the election in July 2013 of Ahmad Assi 
Jarba, Saudi Arabia’s man, as leader of the Syrian National Coalition, the Brother-
hood’s position has been weakened and it has been forced to look after new partners. 
See Raphaël LEFÈVRE, http://www.mei.edu/content/saudi-arabia-and-syrian-
brotherhood. 
52 http://all4syria.info/Archive/86042. 
53 R. LEFÈVRE, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/10/29/militias-for-
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57 http://www.syrrevnews.com/archives/7986 
58 The State security’s interior branch itself could not prevent some believers 
to be killed by the shabbiha gang led by Mujahid Ismail, the delinquent and criminal 
offspring of an Alawite officer involved in the 1982 Hama massacre. 
59 http://www.altawhid.org/2013/11/16/. 
60 It is still unclear how ISIL’s takeover of Mosul province (beginning of 
June 2014) will affect the religious representations of the Syrian war and of the other 
regional conflicts. But the sure thing is that this violent reshaping of borders will 
wreck chaos and modify the alliances. 
